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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Gracie Jean Tryon appeals from her conviction for possession of a controlled
substance, following a jury trial. On appeal, Ms. Tryon asserts the district court erred
when it permitted the admission of certain statements touching on the identity of the
substance at issue, because that violated her constitutional right to confront the
witnesses against her.

Ms. Tryon also asserts the State did not present sufficient

evidence to support her conviction for possession of a controlled substance.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The State charged Ms. Tryon by Information with one count of possession of a
controlled substance, felony, I.C. § 37-2731(c)(1), and one count of possession of drug
paraphernalia, misdemeanor, I.C. § 37-2734A. (R., pp.18-19.) Ms. Tryon entered a not
guilty plea to the charges. (R., pp.20-21.)
The case proceeded to a two-day jury trial. (R., pp.44-67.) During the trial,
Detective Matthew Richardson testified that, before changing police departments, he
had worked for the Caldwell Police Department. (See Tr., p.127, L.7 – p.128, L.2.) He
had been a detective in the street crimes unit (Tr., p.128, Ls.3-5), and had dealt with
methamphetamine almost on a weekly basis, in approximately a hundred cases
(Tr., p.130, L.24 – p.131, L.18). The detective testified he knew methamphetamine was
“a white crystallized substance” through his training and experience. (Tr., p.168, Ls.69.) He had seen methamphetamine packaged in a few different ways, including in small
baggies. (Tr., p.168, Ls.17-25.) One could inject methamphetamine with a syringe or
smoke it with a glass pipe. (Tr., p.170, L.4 – p.171, L.6.)
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Detective Richardson then testified that one evening he had been monitoring a
residence in Caldwell for drug activity. (See Tr., p.173, L.6 – p.175, L.5.) He had been
there previously to assist with misdemeanor probation home visits, and had
encountered drugs or drug paraphernalia at the residence. (See Tr., p.175, Ls.9-20.)
The detective saw a truck that had been parked outside the residence leave.
(Tr., p.175, L.25 – p.176, L.13.) He followed the truck and saw it go through two stop
signs without coming to a complete halt. (See Tr., p.176, L.14 – p.177, L.20.)
Detective Richardson testified he activated the emergency lights on his
unmarked patrol vehicle and stopped the truck. (Tr., p.177, L.21 – p.178, L.13.) He
contacted the driver of the truck, Carl Ringcamp. (See Tr., p.178, L.14 – p.179, L.9.)
Ms. Tryon was the passenger in the truck. (Tr., p.179, Ls.12-14.) While talking to
Mr. Ringcamp, Detective Richardson noticed a faint odor of marijuana coming from the
truck. (Tr., p.180, Ls.8-12.) He had Mr. Ringcamp exit the truck, and spoke with him at
the back of the truck. (Tr., p.180, Ls.13-16.)

As a result of the conversation with

Mr. Ringcamp, Detective Richardson placed him into custody and put him in the back of
the patrol vehicle. (Tr., p.180, L.22 – p.181, L.3.)
The detective testified he then approached the passenger side of the truck.
(Tr., p.181, Ls.7-9.) Another officer had arrived at the scene, and Ms. Tryon had left the
truck. (See Tr., p.181, Ls.9-23.) Detective Richardson testified he overheard Ms. Tryon
state she was not going to allow them to search her purse. (Tr., p.181, L.24 – p.182,
L.1.) He spoke with her about the marijuana odor and a pipe that had possibly been left
on the seat of the truck by Mr. Ringcamp. (See Tr., p.182, Ls.7-13.) The detective
testified Ms. Tryon told him the pipe that had been left on the seat was in her pocket.
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(See Tr., p.182, L.20 – p.183, L.4.) He found a cylinder pipe or e-cigarette on her
person. (Tr., p.188, Ls.8-10.)
Detective Richardson testified he searched the truck. (See Tr., p.183, Ls.16-18.)
He found a small coin purse containing some stems and a black residue in the
passenger side panel door. (Tr., p.183, Ls.21-23.) On the floorboard on the passenger
side was a large purse, with a black case on top. (Tr., p.183, L.23 – p.184, L.1.)
Detective Richardson testified the purse was open and the black case was inside and
on top of the items that were in the purse. (Tr., p.185, Ls.7-22.) He opened the black
case and found a Crown Royal bag. (Tr., p.184, Ls.2-3.) The detective testified he
found two hypodermic syringes and two glass pipes inside the Crown Royal bag.
(Tr., p.184, Ls.3-4.) He further testified that the black case also contained a smaller
blue plastic case, and inside the blue case was “a baggy containing a white crystallized
substance.” (Tr., p.184, Ls.4-8.)
Detective Richardson testified that, in his experience, he had found
methamphetamine coupled with syringes or pipes about seventy-five to eighty percent
of the time. (See Tr., p.191, Ls.18-23.) He testified the white crystalline substance
looked akin to methamphetamine. (Tr., p.193, L.25 – p.194, L.5.)
The State, outside the presence of the jury, had told the district court it intended
to ask Detective Richardson about statements made by Mr. Ringcamp. (See Tr., p.148,
Ls.20-25.)

The State had attempted to subpoena Mr. Ringcamp, but informed the

district court, “[w]e haven’t been able to get him here.” (Tr., p.151, Ls.20-25.) Over
Ms. Tryon’s objection on the basis of her right to confrontation (see Tr., p.159, Ls.2-7),
the district court permitted Detective Richardson to testify on Mr. Ringcamp’s
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statements touching on the identity of the substance (see Tr., p.160, Ls.11-15, p.166,
Ls.16-19). The district court determined the statements were nontestimonial. (See
Tr., p.160, Ls.11-15.) The detective testified that he asked Mr. Ringcamp “whose meth
it was and he stated it wasn’t hers,” while Mr. Ringcamp was in the back of the patrol
vehicle.

(Tr., p.194, Ls.13-19.)

According to Detective Richardson, Mr. Ringcamp

“gave me a couple other responses as well. . . . He again said it wasn’t hers. And then,
he later said, ‘it was mine. Okay.’” (Tr., p.195, Ls.12-17.)
On cross-examination, Detective Richardson testified Mr. Ringcamp had been
arrested. (Tr., p.215, Ls.3-7.) He thought the pipe that was found on Ms. Tryon’s
person had been used to inhale marijuana. (See Tr., p.217, L.20 – p.218, L.9.) The
detective testified he followed the truck for about three or four blocks before it pulled
over, and Mr. Ringcamp had been in a position where he could have placed the black
case on top of the purse. (See Tr., p.218, Ls.19-25.) He did not submit the glass pipes,
syringes, or baggies for DNA testing or fingerprinting. (Tr., p.221, L.21 – p.22, L.25.)
Detective Richardson also did not get a blood or urine sample from Ms. Tryon to see if
she had methamphetamine in her system. (See Tr., p.224, Ls.16-22.) He testified that
kosher salt and other substances could look like methamphetamine. (See Tr., p.230,
Ls.12-22.) During redirect examination, Detective Richardson testified the substance at
issue did not look like kosher salt, but looked like methamphetamine. (See Tr., p.232,
L.21 – p.233, L.1.)
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The State did not present any laboratory test results on the identity of the
substance at issue.1 (See Tr., p.234, Ls.23-25.) After the State rested, Ms. Tryon
requested dismissal of the possession of a controlled substance count, under Idaho
Criminal Rule 29 (“Rule 29”), for lack of sufficient evidence. (Tr., p.234, L.5 – p.236,
L.6, p.240, Ls.9-12.)

The district court denied her Rule 29 motion for judgment of

acquittal, “finding that the State’s evidence is not so insubstantial that jurors could not
help but have a reasonable doubt as to the proof of that—of any elements.” (Tr., p.241,
L.16 – p.242, L.2.) Ms. Tryon did not testify in her defense. (See Tr., p.242, Ls.14-18.)
The jury found Ms. Tryon guilty on both counts. (R., pp.66-67; Tr., p.335, Ls.422.) For possession of a controlled substance, the district court imposed a unified
sentence of four years, with one-and-one-half years fixed, suspended the sentence, and
placed Ms. Tryon on probation for a period of three years.2 (R., pp.88-91.)
Ms. Tryon then filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s Judgment
and Commitment and Order of Probation on Suspended Execution of Judgment.
(R., pp.81-84.)

1

The district court had sustained Ms. Tryon’s objection to Detective Richardson’s
testimony on NARK presumptive tests. (See Tr., p.131, L.19 – p.132, L.3, p.147, L.2 –
p.148, L.14.)
2
For the paraphernalia count, the district court ordered Ms. Tryon to serve two days in
jail, with credit for two days served. (R., p.80.)
5

ISSUES
1.

Did the district court err when it permitted the admission of Mr. Ringcamp’s
statements, because that violated Ms. Tryon’s constitutional right to confront the
witnesses against her?

2.

Did the State present sufficient evidence to support Ms. Tryon’s conviction for
possession of a controlled substance?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred When It Permitted The Admission Of Mr. Ringcamp’s
Statements, Because That Violated Ms. Tryon’s Constitutional Right To Confront The
Witnesses Against Her

A.

Introduction
Ms. Tryon asserts the district court erred when it permitted the admission,

through Detective Richardson, of Mr. Ringcamp’s statements touching on the identity of
the substance at issue. The admission of the statements violated Ms. Tryon’s
constitutional right to confront the witnesses against her. The district court determined
there was no confrontation issue because Mr. Ringcamp’s statements were
nontestimonial. (See Tr., p.160, Ls.11-15.) However, Mr. Ringcamp’s statements were
actually testimonial, because the circumstances objectively indicate that the primary
purpose of the interrogation in this case was to establish or prove past events
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution. Because Ms. Tryon did not have a
prior opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Ringcamp, his statements were inadmissible.
The State will be unable to prove that the admission of Mr. Ringcamp’s statements is
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt

B.

Standard Of Review
The Idaho Supreme Court has held, “[w]hether admission of evidence violates a

defendant’s right to confront adverse witnesses under the Sixth Amendment’s
Confrontation Clause is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review.”
State v. Stanfield, 158 Idaho 327, 331 (2015).
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C.

The Admission Of Mr. Ringcamp’s Statements Violated
Constitutional Right To Confront The Witnesses Against Her

Ms. Tryon’s

Ms. Tryon asserts the admission of Mr. Ringcamp’s statements violated her
constitutional right to confront the witnesses against her.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the right of a
criminal defendant “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”
amend. VI.

U.S. Const.

“The right to confrontation is fundamental and applies equally to state

prosecutions.” Stanfield, 158 Idaho at 332 (citing Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403
(1965)). The Idaho Supreme Court has noted, “[o]ur state constitution does not contain
a confrontation clause similar to that found in the United States Constitution; therefore,
this issue is analyzed solely under the United States Constitution.” Id. (citing State v.
Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 502 (1980)).
According to the United States Supreme Court in Crawford v. Washington, 541
U.S. 36 (2004), the Confrontation Clause “applies to ‘witnesses’ against the accused—
in other words, those who ‘bear testimony.’” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51. The Idaho
Supreme Court in Stanfield explained the United States Supreme Court “has
determined that this language restricts the Confrontation Clause to testimonial hearsay.”
Stanfield, 158 Idaho at 332 (citing Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 823-24 (2006);
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51). The Confrontation Clause “only applies to statements that
are ‘testimonial,’” and “does not bar statements not offered to prove the truth of the
matter asserted.” Id. (citing Davis, 547 U.S. at 823; Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51, 59 n.9).
As discussed by the Stanfield Court, “[a]ny declaration, affirmation, omission, or
nonverbal conduct made for the purpose of establishing some fact, qualifies as a
statement.” Id. “If the statement is testimonial, then its admission is permitted only if

8

the defendant is unavailable and the defendant has had a prior opportunity to crossexamine the defendant.” Id. (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59; State v. Hooper, 145
Idaho 139, 143 (2007)).
The United States Supreme Court in Crawford stated, “the principal evil at which
the Confrontation Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure,
and particularly its use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused.”
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50. After declaring the Confrontation Clause applied to “those
who bear testimony,” the Crawford Court defined “testimony” as “a solemn declaration
or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.” Id. at 51
(alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). The Confrontation Clause therefore
“reflects an especially acute concern with a specific type of out-of-court statement.” Id.
The United States Supreme Court in Crawford then described three formulations
of this core class of testimonial statements: (1) “ex parte in-court testimony or its
functional equivalent—that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior
testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements
that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially”; (2) “extrajudicial
statements . . . contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits,
depositions, prior testimony, or confessions”; and (3) “statements that were made under
circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the
statement would be available for use at a later trial.” Id. at 51-52 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
The Crawford Court further held, “[s]tatements taken by police officers in the
course of interrogations are also testimonial under even a narrow standard.” Id. at 52.
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Later, in Davis, the United States Supreme Court clarified that “[s]tatements are
nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances
objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police
assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.”

Davis, 547 U.S. at 822.

“They are

testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing
emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove
past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.” Id.
Under the “primary purpose test” outlined in Davis, Mr. Ringcamp’s statements
were testimonial. Before Mr. Ringcamp gave the statements to Detective Richardson,
the detective had already separated him from Ms. Tryon, placed him in custody, and put
him in the back of the patrol vehicle. (See Tr., p.180, Ls.13-25, p.194, L.10 – p.195,
L.17.)

The record is devoid of any sign Detective Richardson’s interrogation was

intended to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.

Rather,

objectively viewed, the primary purpose of the interrogation was to investigate a
possible crime, namely possession of a controlled substance. While the interrogation
here was not as formal as the one in Crawford, which followed a Miranda warning, was
tape-recorded, and took place at the station house, see 541 U.S. at 53 n.4, Detective
Richardson’s interrogation was formal enough in that it took place in his patrol vehicle
and away from Ms. Tryon. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 830. Thus, the circumstances
objectively indicate that the primary purpose of the interrogation in this case was to
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution. See id.
at 822. Mr. Ringcamp’s statements were testimonial.
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The district court determined that there was no confrontation issue here because
the holding in United States v. Johnson, 581 F.3d 320 (6th Cir. 2009), “probably applies
to this as well.” (See Tr., p.160, Ls.11-15). The district court was incorrect, because
the circumstances in Johnson are readily distinguishable from those in the
present case.
In Johnson, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held,
“[b]ecause [the declarant] did not know that his statements were being recorded and
because it is clear that he did not anticipate them being used in a criminal proceeding
against [the defendant], they are not testimonial, and the Confrontation Clause does not
apply.” Johnson, 581 F.3d at 325. The declarant in Johnson unwittingly made his
statements to an FBI informant while both were at the same prison facility. See id. at
323.

Additionally, the cases cited by the Johnson Court in support of its holding

involved statements made under similar circumstances. See, e.g., United States v.
Johnson, 440 F.3d 832, 843 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that an unwitting declarant’s
secretly recorded statements to a close friend were nontestimonial); United States v.
Mooneyham, 473 F.3d 280, 286-87 (6th Cir. 2007) (stating that a co-defendant’s out-ofcourt statements to an undercover officer, whose status was unknown to the declarant,
were nontestimonial); United States v. Watson, 525 F.3d 583, 589 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[A]
statement unwittingly made to a confidential informant and recorded by the government
is not ‘testimonial’ for Confrontation Clause purposes.”)
The result in Johnson is also in accord with Davis, where the Court described the
statements at issue in some pre-Crawford decisions of the United States Supreme
Court as “clearly nontestimonial.” See Davis, 547 U.S. at 825; see also Bourjaily v.
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United States, 483 U.S. 171, 181-84 (1987) (statements made unwittingly to a
Government informant); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 87-89 (1970) (statements from
one prisoner to another).
In contrast, Mr. Ringcamp did not make his statements to a friend or a
confidential informant whose status was unknown to him. Rather, the circumstances
show Mr. Ringcamp knew he was giving his statements to a law enforcement officer.
Before he stopped the truck, Detective Richardson activated the emergency lights on
his unmarked patrol vehicle. (See Tr., p.177, L.21 – p.178, L.13.) The detective later
placed Mr. Ringcamp in custody and put him in the back of the patrol vehicle. (See
Tr., p.180, Ls.13-25.) Thus, the circumstances in Johnson are readily distinguishable
from those in the present case, and the Johnson holding does not control here.
In its arguments for why Mr. Ringcamp’s statements were not testimonial, the
State contended the statements were made to exculpate rather than inculpate
Ms. Tryon. (See Tr., p.155, L.12 – p.156, L.8.) The State argued “the definition of
testimonial is a statement made by the declarant where he could reasonably expect the
statement would be used by the State to accuse a criminal defendant of a crime.”
(Tr., p.155, Ls.12-16.) The State further argued, “I don’t think anyone at the time would
have possibly guessed that the statement, ‘that’s my meth,’ which is made purely to
exculpate this particular defendant, would be used later to prove that it was meth.”
(Tr., p.155, Ls.16-21.)
However, the State’s argument was based on an incorrect definition of
“testimonial.” As seen above, the United States Supreme Court has defined “testimony”
as “a solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving
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some fact.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51. Statements made in the course of a police
interrogation “are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate . . . that the
primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially
relevant to later criminal prosecution.” Davis, 547 U.S. at 822.
The United States Supreme Court’s standards for what is “testimonial” do not
contain any requirement that the statements at issue accuse or inculpate any particular
defendant. In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009), a case where the
United States Supreme Court addressed whether statements contained in forensic
reports are “testimonial,” the Court rejected the argument that the analysts who
prepared the reports were “not subject to confrontation because they are not
‘accusatory’ witnesses, in that they do not directly accuse petitioner of wrongdoing;
rather, their testimony is inculpatory only when taken together with other evidence
linking petitioner to the contraband.” See Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 313. The Court
explained that, to the extent the analysts were witnesses, “they certainly provided
testimony against petitioner, proving one fact necessary for his conviction—that the
substance he possessed was cocaine.” Id.
The Melendez-Diaz Court also examined how “the Confrontation Clause
guarantees a defendant the right to be confronted with the witnesses ‘against him,’”
while “the Compulsory Process Clause guarantees a defendant the right to call
witnesses ‘in his favor.’” Id. (quoting U.S. Const. amend. VI). The Sixth Amendment
therefore “contemplates two classes of witnesses—those against the defendant and
those in his favor. The prosecution must produce the former; the defendant may call
the latter.” Id. at 313-14 (footnote omitted). The Court held “there is not a third category
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of witnesses, helpful to the prosecution, but somehow immune from confrontation.” Id.
at 314.
Despite Melendez-Diaz, the State in this case contended, “[w]e happen to have a
particular case in which an exculpatory statement is useful to us.” (See Tr., p.156, Ls.68.)

In other words, the State argued Mr. Ringcamp’s statements fell into the third

category of witnesses, as rejected by the United States Supreme Court. See MelendezDiaz, 557 U.S. at 314. Further, much like the testimony of the analysts in MelendezDiaz, which proved the substance was cocaine, Mr. Ringcamp’s statements were
against Ms. Tryon, helping to prove one fact necessary for her conviction—that the
substance at issue was methamphetamine. See id. at 313 Thus, even though the
statements were “inculpatory only when taken together with other evidence linking
[Ms. Tryon] to the contraband,” see id., they were still testimonial.
Admittedly, the United States Supreme Court’s more recent opinion in Williams v.
Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012), has muddied the waters about whether a statement
must accuse or inculpate a particular defendant to be testimonial. See Williams, 132 S.
Ct. at 2243-44 (plurality opinion) (holding a DNA profile, relied upon by a testifying
expert but not entered into evidence, was not testimonial because it “plainly was not
prepared for the primary purpose of accusing a targeted individual”). However, Williams
was a fractured opinion: while the plurality held the DNA profile was nontestimonial
because its primary purpose was not to create evidence against the defendant, see id.
at 2243-44, Justice Thomas, in his concurrence, agreed the profile was nontestimonial
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but solely because it lacked the requisite formality and solemnity.3 Id. at 2255 (Thomas,
J., concurring).

The four dissenting justices rejected the plurality’s accusatory

requirement. Id. at 2273-74 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
In light of the fractured opinion in Williams, the Idaho Supreme Court has held,
“[b]ecause no position received support from a majority of the justices, Williams does
not provide us a governing legal principle and this Court views the decision as limited to
the unique set of facts presented in that case.” Stanfield, 158 Idaho at 336. Thus,
Williams does not impose a requirement that a statement must accuse or inculpate a
particular defendant for the statement to be testimonial. Under the “primary purpose
test” outlined in Davis, Mr. Ringcamp’s statements were testimonial.
Because Mr. Ringcamp’s statements were testimonial, their admission was
permitted under the Confrontation Clause only if Mr. Ringcamp were unavailable and
Ms. Tryon had a prior opportunity to cross-examine him. See Stanfield, 158 Idaho at
332. Here, even assuming Mr. Ringcamp was unavailable, Ms. Tryon did not have a
prior opportunity to cross-examine him.
inadmissible.

Thus, Mr. Ringcamp’s statements were

The district court erred when it permitted the admission, through

Detective Richardson, of Mr. Ringcamp’s statements, because that violated Ms. Tryon’s
constitutional right to confront the witnesses against her.

3

No other justice has joined with Justice Thomas in support of the “indicia of solemnity”
test, since he first proposed it in his partial concurrence in Davis. See, e.g., Davis, 547
U.S. at 834-42 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Michigan v.
Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 378-79 (2011) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
15

D.

The State Will Be Unable To Prove That The Admission Of Mr. Ringcamp’s
Statements Is Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt
Ms. Tryon asserts the State will be unable to prove that the admission of

Mr. Ringcamp’s statements is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Where alleged error is followed by a contemporaneous objection and the
appellant shows that a violation occurred, the State bears the burden of proving the
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, based upon the test articulated by the
United States Supreme Court in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).

See

State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010). “To hold an error as harmless, an appellate
court must declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was no reasonable
possibility that such evidence complained of contributed to the conviction.” State v.
Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 507 (1980) (citing Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24).
Here, the State did not present any direct evidence, such as laboratory test
results on the identity of the substance, showing the substance at issue was
methamphetamine. (See Tr., p.234, Ls.23-25.) Thus, the State’s case relied entirely on
circumstantial evidence. Mr. Ringcamp’s statements, which suggested the substance
was methamphetamine, were important circumstantial evidence for the State.

For

example, in its closing argument, the State advised the jury to consider “how they talked
about

it.”

(Tr.,

p.288,

Ls.24-25.)

The

State

emphasized

that

when

Detective Richardson asked whose methamphetamine it was, Mr. Ringcamp “says, ‘It’s
mine.’ Okay? He doesn’t say, ‘It’s not meth.’ That’s not what he’s saying. ‘It’s mine.’”
(Tr., p.289, Ls.8-17; see Tr., p.290, Ls.19-21.)
Further, in the State’s reply during closing argument, the State told the jury,
“don’t forget what Carl Ringcamp said.”

(Tr., p.328, Ls.24-25.)
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The State argued,

alongside the other circumstantial evidence, “also you’ve got the other guy who’s there
saying—and he’s jumping on a grenade, essentially, right? He’s trying to jump on the
grenade, saying ‘it’s mine, it’s mine.’” (See Tr., p.329, Ls.2-10.) The State questioned
why Mr. Ringcamp would do so if the substance were rock salt or another crystalline
substance. (See Tr., p.329, Ls.10-15.) According to the State, “[t]he only reason, the
only logical explanation is it’s exactly what the context of the question implies, which is
that it was meth.” (Tr., p.329, Ls.16-18.) Still later in the reply, the State argued it
“[d]oesn’t make any sense that Ringcamp is willing to jump on this grenade if there’s no
grenade. Doesn’t make any sense.” (Tr., p.331, Ls.22-24.)
Because Mr. Ringcamp’s statements were important circumstantial evidence for
the State, there is a reasonable possibility the statements contributed to Ms. Tryon’s
conviction. See Sharp, 101 Idaho at 507. Thus, Ms. Tryon asserts the State will be
unable to prove that the admission of Mr. Ringcamp’s statements is harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.
The district court erred when it permitted the admission of Mr. Ringcamp’s
statements touching on the identity of the substance at issue, because that violated
Ms. Tryon’s constitutional right to confront the witnesses against her. Thus, Ms. Tryon’s
conviction for possession of a controlled substance should be vacated, and the matter
should be remanded to the district court for a new trial.

17

II.
The State Did Not Present Sufficient Evidence To Support Ms. Tryon’s Conviction For
Possession Of A Controlled Substance

A.

Introduction
Ms. Tryon asserts the State did not present sufficient evidence to support her

conviction for possession of a controlled substance. Ms. Tryon asserted the State had
not proven the substance at issue was methamphetamine. (See Tr., p.235, Ls.7-14.)
The district court denied Ms. Tryon’s Rule 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal, “finding
that the State’s evidence is not so insubstantial that jurors could not help but have a
reasonable doubt as to the proof . . . of any elements.” (See Tr., p.241, Ls.16-23.)
However,

the

jury

could

not

properly

find

that

the

substance

here

was methamphetamine.

B.

Standard Of Review And Relevant Law
Idaho Criminal Rule 29 provides a district court may grant a defendant’s motion

for acquittal after the evidence on either side is closed, “if the evidence is insufficient to
sustain a conviction . . . .” I.C.R. 29(a). As part of the right to due process guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, “no person shall be
made to suffer the onus of a criminal conviction except upon sufficient proof—defined
as evidence necessary to convince a trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the
existence of every element of the offense.” State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 460
(2012) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316 (1979)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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When an appellate court determines whether a conviction should be upheld, the
inquiry is whether “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”

See id. (internal quotation marks omitted)

(emphasis in original). In conducting this analysis, an appellate court “is required to
consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the State,” and will not substitute its
“judgment for that of the jury on issues of witness credibility, weight of the evidence, or
reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.” Id. (citing State v. Oliver, 144
Idaho 722, 724 (2007)).

C.

The Jury Could Not Properly Find That The Substance At Issue Here
Was Methamphetamine
Ms. Tryon asserts the jury could not properly find that the substance at issue

here was methamphetamine. Idaho Code § 37-2732(c)(1), the statute under which
Ms. Tryon was convicted, generally prohibits the possession of controlled substances
included in schedule I, such as methamphetamine. See I.C. §§ 37-2705(d)(5) & 372732(c)(1).

Thus, one of the essential elements the State had to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt here was that the identity of the substance was what the State
purported it to be, namely, methamphetamine. See § 37-2732(c)(1).
Because the State did not present laboratory test results showing the substance
was methamphetamine, the question is whether the State presented sufficient
circumstantial evidence to prove its identity.

In State v. Mitchell, 130 Idaho 134

(Ct. App. 1997), the Idaho Court of Appeals held “circumstantial evidence may be
sufficient to prove the identity of a substance where laboratory analysis is not available.”
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Mitchell, 130 Idaho at 136. The Mitchell Court based its holding on the general longheld stance in Idaho that “the government’s burden to prove the elements of an offense
may be met with wholly circumstantial evidence,” id., as well as cases from other
jurisdictions concluding “the burden of proving a controlled substance may be met with
circumstantial evidence,” id.
However, the Mitchell Court was also careful to emphasize its “holding does not
alter the State’s burden of proof; it remains incumbent upon the State to provide
evidence that meets the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. “Chemical
analysis of a substance remains the preferable and the most reliable evidence of its
identity, and the sufficiency of less direct evidence must be evaluated on a case-bycase basis.” Id.
The Mitchell Court held “[t]he entirety of the evidence, when viewed in the light
most favorable to the State, is sufficient to support the jury’s inference that the
substance delivered by [the defendant] was methamphetamine.”

Id. at 137.

The

informant who purchased methamphetamine from the defendant in Mitchell provided
testimony that established he was familiar with methamphetamine. Id. at 136-37. The
informant had purchased and used methamphetamine before, and the substance he
purchased from the defendant was packaged by a method commonly used to package
methamphetamine. Id. at 136. The informant had also testified he had made at least
three prior purchases of methamphetamine from the defendant. Id. The informant
testified that, with respect to the purchase at issue, the defendant had offered to sell
“methamphetamine” to him, he gave the defendant the same price he had previously
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paid for methamphetamine, and the substance given to him by the defendant looked
like methamphetamine. See id. at 136-37.
Further, the confidential informant in Mitchell testified that after the defendant
learned the informant was wearing a wire, the defendant reached into the informant’s
car, pulled out his hand in a closed fist, and ran away. Id. at 137. The Mitchell Court
held the jury could conclude from that evidence the defendant fled with the canister
containing the substance.

See id.

According to the Court, that conduct by the

defendant “allows a further inference that he had indeed delivered methamphetamine to
[the confidential informant] and was anxious to recover and dispose of it when he
became aware of [the informant’s] body wire.” Id. In sum, the Mitchell Court held
substantial evidence was presented at the trial from which the jury could properly find
that the substance the defendant delivered was methamphetamine. Id.
Conversely, here the State did not present sufficient evidence from which the jury
could properly find that the substance was methamphetamine. Outside the improperlyadmitted statements of Mr. Ringcamp, the only evidence submitted by the State as to
the identity of the substance came from the rest of Detective Richardson’s testimony.
The detective testified he had dealt with methamphetamine on almost a weekly basis, in
about one hundred cases. (See Tr., p.131, Ls.1-18.) He was watching the house from
which the truck left to see if there was any drug activity. (See Tr., p.174, L.18 – p.175,
L.5.) He also testified he found methamphetamine coupled with syringes or pipes about
75% to 80% of the time. (See Tr., p.191, Ls.10-23.) The substance here was found
right next to the syringes and pipes. (See Tr., p.192, L.25 – p.193, L.3.) Detective
Richardson testified the substance looked akin to methamphetamine. (Tr., p.193, L.25
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– p.194, L.5.) However, on cross-examination the detective testified kosher salt and
other substances could look like methamphetamine. (See Tr., p.230, Ls.18-22.)
Ms. Tryon submits the above evidence, even when considered in the light most
favorable to the State, was insufficient to show the substance at issue was
methamphetamine. In contrast to Mitchell, where the alleged drugs at issue had not
been recovered by the police, see 130 Idaho at 135, the State admitted the substance
here as an exhibit and published it for the jury. (See State’s Ex. 4; Tr., p.201, L.14 –
p.202, L.15.) But the State did not present any laboratory test results on the identity of
the substance. (See Tr., p.234, Ls.23-25.) Further, unlike the defendant in Mitchell,
see 130 Idaho at 136-37, there was no evidence presented that Ms. Tryon had a history
of selling methamphetamine.

Additionally, while Detective Richardson testified the

substance looked like methamphetamine, as opposed to kosher salt (see, e.g.,
Tr., p.232, L.21 – p.233, L.1), he also testified other substances could look like
methamphetamine (see Tr., p.230, L.20-22). Thus, the jury could not properly find that
the substance here was methamphetamine.
The State did not present sufficient evidence to support Ms. Tryon’s conviction
for possession of a controlled substance.

Thus, the judgment of conviction for

possession of a controlled substance should be vacated, and the matter should be
remanded to the district court for the entry of a judgment of acquittal on that charge.
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CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Ms. Tryon respectfully requests this Court vacate her
judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled substance, and remand the
matter to the district court for a new trial. Alternatively, Ms. Tryon respectfully requests
this Court vacate her judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled substance,
and remand the matter to the district court for the entry of a judgment of acquittal.
DATED this 4th day of May, 2017.

__________/s/_______________
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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